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     As Hungary made its transition to democracy, it had to 
overhaul its political, economic and defense system. The 
shift to a democratic form of government and free enterprise 
economy depends on a military that is firmly under civilian 
authority. Within the defense sector, the endurance of such 
a new democracy requires reforming its intelligence system. 
Hungary must choose the intelligence system that best serves 
its goals and needs. Despite the relatively strong success 
in implementing a democratic system, market economy and 
civilian control of the military since 1989, the 
transformation of its intelligence agencies is incomplete. 
The intelligence organizations holds fast to the old concept 
of an oversized, hyper bureaucratic intelligence system, and 
still lack appropriate, Western-type civil control and 
oversight. The system itself has been changing but not at 
the adequate speed and to some extent, it has kept the 
baggage of its past. Recent international terrorism also 
presents an opportunity to examine the Hungarian 
intelligence system and how it is structured, evaluating it 
for deficiencies and further develop what is working in the 
Hungarian security services. This analysis describes various 
other national intelligence organizations and examines 
intelligence oversight in the Hungarian constitutional 
democracy with recommendations for the possible guidelines 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is not the end. 
 It is not even the beginning of the end.  
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. 
 
(Churchill) 
Hungary has come a long way. The National Assembly 
has effectively developed oversight of the 
military through budget, approval of the Basic 
Principles of National Defense and the Defense 
Bill, and deployment of the Armed Forces. The 
Constitutional Court has effectively addressed the 
problems caused by the October 1989 Constitution 
and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform; and its 
decisions have been respected. The military has 
evidenced significant reform; it has been 
restructured to accommodate NATO, but force 
modernization continues to be greatly restrained 
by scarce resources. But Hungary still has a 
number of tasks to achieve effective civilian 
oversight (...)1  
 
Every country that reforms its defense and intelligence 
system must decide on the mechanisms and structure, that are 
best suited for its needs. The end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent collapse of Communism in Europe brought change to 
Hungarys society. Its defense and security service system 
has also gone through a transformation. Despite the 
relatively strong success in implementing a democratic 
system, market economy and civilian control of the military 
since 1989, the transformation of its intelligence agencies 
is not yet complete. The Hungarian intelligence community 
holds fast to its old concepts and remains an oversized and 
                    
 
 
 1  
 
1   Simon Jeffrey, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO 




hyper bureaucratic organization. It lacks appropriate civil 
control and oversight. The system itself has been changing 
t slowly and to some extent, it has failed to shed the 
baggage from its past. Recent terrorist inc
opportunity to examine
architecture and to evaluate its deficiencies as we
rength. 
ce 
organizations and mechanisms for intelligence oversight. It 
also 
intelligence system. The first section describes current 
democratic control and oversight. Using relevant legal and 
acade
overv
intelligence system and identifies its remaining obstacles 
to civilian control. It focuses on the interaction between 





idents provide an 
 the Hungarian intelligence 
ll as its 
st
 
This analysis describes Hungarian national intelligen
makes recommendations for reform of the Hungarian 
mic works, the next part of this thesis offers an 
iew of the current organizations of the Hungarian 
ublic. The third section offers a roadmap for the 
reform of Hungarian intelligence services in light of a 
changing international environment. Finally, the thesis will
suggest that even with the new and democratic legal 
framework, old habits and structures need to be transformed 
and euroformised based on the requirements of colle
security and Western security doctrines.  
 2  
  
 
II. METAMORPHOSIS OF THE OVERSIGHT AND DEMOCRATIC 
CONTROL 
 
The change of system has offered us a unique
irreproducible opportunity to reintegrate once and 




atic states which are bound together by 
commitment to the basic values typical of 




The Hungarian experience serves as an important example 
of the problems encountered in the transitions to democratic 
control of a nations military. The Hungarian case is 
exceptional because the real reform of the entire 
                    
t
al
institutional frameworks and substance, respect 
for human rights including minority rights and an 
economy based on private property and free 
initiative. Not to miss such a historic 
opportunity this time must be the task and guiding 
principle of action of all responsible 
politicians, political parties and the 
government.2  
  
Democracy and democratic oversight of a defense and
intelligence establishment is not automatically guaranteed 
and cannot be instituted overnight. In Western democratic 
states, military and security organizations developed in 
parallel to the political and societal institutions. Whe
the transitional democracies of the former Warsaw Pact 
countries are concerned, the reorganization of such 
institutions offers a more complex challenge, because
security reforms are being made while the new political 
structure is undergoing rapid change.  
 
 3  
 
2    Martonyi J., Németh Zs, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration, Joó R, Hungary: A member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry 
of Foreign Arrairs, 1999), p. 13. 
 
  
intelligence system has been delayed for 14 years. 
I
political forces (Hungarian Democratic Forum, Free 
Democrats Alliance, Young Democrats Coalition) of 1989-90 
were able to negotiate with the ruling Hungarian Socialist 
Workers Party. The first democratic elections in 1990 ended 
the rule of the communist party and the domination of the 
Army in the Hungarian politics. Even though the first non-
communist government of József Antall nominated the first 
civilian Minister of Defense, Moscow continued the Hungarian 
Armed Forces to guarantee that Hungary would remain within 
the Soviet sphere of influence. According to Zoltan Baranyi: 
 of the four central European states 








                    




consolidated. Post-communist Hungarian politics 
have been characterized by a level of stability 
uncommon in the region; indeed, it is the only 
central or eastern European state where, as of 
early 1999, each of two freely elected governments 




Between 1989 and 19990, the new political elite 
suffered from many handicaps in their effort to establi
civilian oversight and re-orient their countrys foreign 
security policies. They did not possess 
ient administrative structures. The one advantage that 
civilians did enjoy vis-a-vis the military was their greater 
exposure to democratic principles and practices prior t
1989. Knowledge of Western political thinking and p
 
 4  
3          Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, 
Andrew A. Michta, Americas New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic in NATO, (Washington D.C., University of Washington 
Press, 1999), p. 78. 
  
were important assets in gaining acceptance and genu
respect in the eyes of the military.4  
 
It took more than a year for the Antall-government to 
leave the Warsaw Pact, begin to achieve full political 
independence from Moscow, and institute an unprecedented 
civilian control over the military. On 1 July 1991, as the 
last Soviet forces left the country, a new framework for 
Hungarian civil-military relations had been established. As
events at home and across Eastern and Central Europe 
unfolded, the challenges of developing stable and strong 




clear division of responsibilities between the Ministry and 
the General Staff, as well as the practical implementation 
of new rules and regulations, became a common goal of the 
Parliamentary Parties. In the process of transformation the 
focus of the governments shifted slightly from creating 
narrow internal reforms to gain Western cooperation to 
finding ways to integrate into the Western security system. 
 
                    
 
The creation of a civilian Ministry of Defense, with 
Internal strategies for civilian oversight of the armed 
forces and secret services were subordinated to Euro-
Atlantic integration. The requirements of the Western
institutions were strict and demanded well working 
democratic institutions. Democratic control of the military 
was regarded as a fundamental obligation for integration. 
According to Jeffrey Simon: 
  
 
4    Réka Szemerkényi: Western Policies and Civilian Control of the 
 5  
Military in Central Europe, Conference on Civil-military Relati
in the Context of an Evolving NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Defens





The existence of a constitutional and legal 
framework has resulted from Const
decisions that have effectively
itutional Court 
 addressed the 
oblems caused by the October 1989 Constitution 
 was 






and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform; the Courts 
decisions have been respected and been 
incorporated in the 1993 National Defense Act an 
subsequent legislation. Continued wrangling over 
the Constitutional draft since 1994 and the 
delaying of its acceptance is worrisome. Work to 
re-write the constitution was initially intended 
to be completed in 1995, but it is taking much 
longer.5  
 
Following NATOs Madrid Summit 1997, when Hungary
invited to join the Alliance, the country returned to the 
institutions and practices of democratic pluralism, ending 
ecret services was begun. These organizations were to 
be reformed a modernizing process according to the new 
constitutional and legislative framework and principles of 
rule of law. 
 
Hungarys new political system continues to encounte
resistance to the transformation of the democratic contr
from defense and security. The level of civilian involvement 
in security and defense policy-making is an important 
indicator of the stability and democratization in the 
consolidating democracies.6 Post-communist transitions 
 
 
                     
5    Jeffrey Simon: New Challenges in Hungarian Civil-military 
Relations, Conference on Civil-military Relations in the Context of 
an Evolving NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
    
 6  
Foreign Affairs, 1997), p. 169. 
6 Réka Szemerkényi: Western Policies and Civilian Control of the 
Military in Central Europe, Conference on Civil-military Relations 
in the Context of an Evolving NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Defense 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997), p. 47. 
  
generally more traumatic for armed forces than for other 




                     
 7  
7    Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, 
Andrew A. Michta, Americas New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic in NATO, (Washington D.C:, University of Washington 
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HUNGARIAN 
INTELLIGENCE 
 
Hungary has had its own independent security service 
nce the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. 
til the end of the WWII, the 2nd Directorate of the 
neral Staff was responsible for intelligence. The 2nd 
rectorate of the General Staff was heavily involved in 
litics, maintained direct connection to Governor János 
rthy and enjoyed freedom of action regarding any internal 
 external security issues.  
 
As events unfolded in Europe after WWII, and the Iron 
rtain fell, the Communist regime took control. The realm 
of intelligence was extended. In addition to military 
intelligence, civilian services, to include foreign and 
domestic intelligence, were established under the direction 
of the Ministry of Interior that had not existed in this 
structure before 1947 elections. During the Cold War, the 
Hungarian Security Services worked closely with their Soviet 
counterparts (KGB, GRU, STAZI or SECURITATE), without laws 
or oversight to provide direction and limit their 
activities. Presumably, the purpose of the secret services 
was to protect the regime and the communist party from any 
internal and external dissent. According to Reka 
Szemerkenyi: 
 
There were many reasons for Western policymakers 
to be concerned about civil military relations in 
Central Europe after the break-up of the Warsaw 
Pact. Primarily, it was of importance how the 
Soviettrained officer corps was going to react to 
the political changes in Central Europe, and 
whether they represented any challenge to 









 9  
  
institutions. The survival of the Warsaw Pact-type 
political and military mentality among officer 
corps was perceived as a major risk both by the 
stern and Centra y-makers.8  
    
ral 
i, 
ble agent. A year later, he 










During the post Cold War political transformation, the
former state security system ceased to exist and a new 
security structure was established. The change of the 
political system was accompanied and accelerated by seve
state security scandals such as the case of Conrad, Belova
or Carlos. Lt. Colonel Belovai started off working for 
Hungarian intelligence, but in 1984 in London, he contacted 
the CIA and began life as a dou
nced to life in prison by a military court. He was 
first in line to translate and evaluate material from what 
turned out to be the Conrad spy ring, one of the most 
damaging espionage operations ever against NATO. Former U
Army Sgt. Clyde Conrad was arrested in 1988 and sentenced to 
life in prison for espionage by a West German court. In 19
it was disclosed that the terrorist Roberto Carlos (alias 
Jackal) had been given refuge in Hungary in 1979. According 
to Hungarians, Carlos's refuge was conditional on his 
suspending all terrorist activities and that he was expelled
in 1982.9 
 
In 1990, opposition political parties publicized facts 
revealing illegal political activities such as wir
and i legal sul
                     
éka Szemerkényi: Western Policies and Civilian Control of the 
ilitary in Central Europe, Conference on Civil-military Relati
nd Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997), p. 47. 
errorist Carlos in Hungary, Online: 
ttp://www.videofact.com/english/terrorists8.htm
ons 
in the Context of an Evolving NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Defense 
a
9    T
h  (25 May 2003) 
8    R
M
 10  
  






ture of the police.  
 
As a consequence of the scandals and their 
investigation, police and the state security service wer
separated to establish a clear distinction between crim
investigation and intelligence issues. The role of the 
civilian security services was transformed and they were 
placed under the Minister Without Portfolio in Direction
the Civilian National Security Services. As far as the 
military intelligence and counterintelligence was concerned,
it was reorganized structurally but remained under the 
supervision of the Minister of Defense. Further 
reorganization and rationalization were undertaken. At the 
same time, Parliament passed a temporary Act granting 
approval by the Minister of Justice for the use of 
intelligence methods by the new security services and the 
police. Organizational aspects of the service were regulated 
by governmental decrees. The secret services worked by 
temporary rules until reorganized on a permanent bases in 
1995 when Act no. CXXV was introduced.  
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IV. STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES 
The actual composition, role and function of the 
telligence services were the result of much debate among 
ngarian political parties. The culmination of that debate 
s Act no. CXXV, which in 1995 defined the general mission 
 the security services as the protection of the national 
curity interests of the Hungarian Republic.   
 
The services are charged with protecting national 
curity by using both open and confidential means of 
formation collection. More precisely, under the law, the 
rm national security refers both to the defense of the 
sovereignty of the country and to the protection of the 
constitutional order. Protection of the national security of 
Hungary involves the detection of efforts to attack the 
independence and territorial integrity of the country; the 
detection and prevention of clandestine efforts which may 
injure or threaten the political, economic and military or 
defense interests of the country; the acquisition of 
information about foreign countries or information of 
foreign origin that is important for governmental decisions; 
the detection and prevention of clandestine efforts to 
change or disturb through unlawful means the constitutional 
order that ensures basic human rights, the multi-party 
representative democracy and the functioning of 
constitutional institutions; and, detecting and preventing 










 13  
  
illegal traffic in internationally controlled goods and 
technologies.10 
ry11 





The Act recognizes five security services in Hunga
(Figure 1):  
• the Intelligence Bureau (IB) 
• the National Security Bureau (NSB)  
• the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) 
 
 the Special Service for National Security (SSNS)
 
Three of these agencies -- the Intelligence Bureau, the
National Security Bureau and the Special Services for 
National Security -- are grouped under the term civil 
national security services. The other two -- the Military 
Intelligence Bureau and the Military Security Bureau -- a
referred to as the military national security services.  
                     
 14  
10   Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, (Budapest, 
1995), § 3-8. 
11   Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, (Budapest, 




V. SUPERVISION, DIRECTION AND OVERSIGHT 
 
versight and direction are two distinct 
nce agencies can be discussed. The former 
whether the agency is subject to some 
form of review or oversight by a body outside of 
the executive branch (...) The latter concerns the 
extent to which the agency is independent from 




Basic Principles of National Security and are empowered to 
regulate the execution of such tasks in the form of 
ministerial decrees. They also have the authority to carry 
out the direct control of the National Security Services in 
accordance with the governmental decisions and the National 
Security plans. Each minister is empowered to issue general 
and concrete instructions without depriving the heads of the 
services of their powers and without obstructing the 
exercise of their competence.13  
 
O
senses in which the autonomy of the security 
intellige
concerns 
cutive branch of the government.12 
ISTERIAL CONTROL 
 
The Act no. CXXV, 1995, states that the Government 
controls the civil national security services through a 
designated Minister and the military security services 
through the Minister of Defense. The responsible minister 
determines the particular tasks of the services, oversees 
their activities, and regulates their functions and 
organization. The Ministers are also responsible for the 
                     
12   Peter Gill, Policing Politics, Security Intelligence and the 
Liberal Democratic State, (London, Frank Class, 1994), p. 217. 
13   Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, (Budapest, 
 15  
1995),  § 10. 
  
The Minister has the power to task the security 
services and to give the services orders. He also supervises 
the budgetary management of the services as well as their 
legal operation, and is authorized to make recommendations 
to the Prime Minister as to the appointment and dismissal of 
the D
framework of the rules of law and other binding guidelines 








rly, but at the minimum 
                    
irector Generals and their deputies. Within the 
nsible for the activities of the servire
 
B.  ARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGP
 
The Parliament defines the Basic Principles of Natio
Security and Defense and makes decisions concerning the l
term development of the defense and security organizatio
The Parliament also allocates financial resources for the 
carrying out of security and defense tasks on an annual 
basis. The Parliament exercises parliamentary oversig
the national security services through its Committee on 
National Security (CNS).  
 
CNS was established in 1990 as an ad hoc committee. 
Today, the Committee is a permanent committee of the 
Parliament with 11 members. The president of the Committee 
must be a Member of Parliament (MP) from one of the 
opposition parties.15 The responsible Minister is required 
to inform the Committee about the general activities o
national security services regula
 
14   Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, (Budapest, 
1995), §11. 




 16  
  
twice a year. The Government also must inform the Committee 
about its decisions regarding matters brought to its 
attention by the Minister.  
 
The Committee has the right to request information from 
the Minister and the General Directors of the services
the national security situation of the country and the 
operation and activities of national security services. It 
can request information from the Minister of Ju
 about 
ce and the 
Minister supervising civil national security services and 
and the General Directors 
about specific uses of secret technical devices and methods. 
Also,
l 
can ask the Minister to conduct 




hear testimony from its members. The Committee is also 
entitled to call on the Minister to take measures in such 
sti
question the Defense Minister 
 it examines individual complaints against unlawful 
activities of the national security services. In cases when 
the complainant does not accept the results of an 
investigation carried out by the Minister supervising the 
national security services, the Committee informs the 
complainant about its findings. If the Committee believes 
that one of the security services is carrying out unlawfu
or improper activities, it 
ttee about the findings of the investigation.16  
 
The Committee is empowered, according to the law, to 
carry out a fact-finding investigation if it finds th
security service operated in violation of the law. During 
this investigation, the Committee has the right to examine 
the security service's documents concerning the case and t
                     
16    Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, (Budapest, 
 17  
1995), §14(4)a-h. 
  
cases, and it can also initiate the establishment of 
responsibility for such operation.  
 









who have passed a national security clearance may become 
members of the oversight committee. This security clearance 
pinion on the detailed draft budget of the national 
security services. It also conducts nomination hearings for 
those appointed as Director Generals of the national 
security services. The Committee has the right to examine 
any files or information reports prepared for the Government 
by the national security services. If the NSB launches an 
investigation and secret collection of information agains
an MP or against one of his or her family members, the 
Minister will have to report it to the Committee. The MP i
question, in this case, will not be informed about the 
activity. The Defense Committee (DC) in the Parliam
among other tasks, exercises oversight of military security
services. The NSC and DC hold closed sessions when 
exercising their oversight authorities.17  
 
The members of the oversight committees are obliged not
to disclose classified information about the service, eve
after their terms in Parliament have ended. Only those
is carried out by the NSB with the written consent of the 
MPs in question. The NSC makes public reports on fact-
finding missions, but no regular reports are published.18  
 
 
                     
17    Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, (Budapest, 
1995), §16-17. 
 18  









 the right to 
infor
any information he comes across a secret. In the case of 
data processing concerning state or service secrets that is 
carried out by the police, or by national security services, 
RI
 
Control also is exercised by the Ombudspersons. The 
individuals who especially scrutinize the services are known 
as the Parliamentary Commissioner for Citizens' Rights and 
the Commissioner for Data Protection. Act no. LXIII of 1992
on the protection of personal data and data of public 
interest (further as data protection law) established the 
institution of a Commissioner for Data Protection; this 
Commissioner has the same status as Commissioners for 
Citizens' Rights. The Commissioner for Data Protection 
ensures that the services observe regulations concerning 
data processing, examines complaints, and maintains the d
protection register. Within this framework, the Commissioner 
has the power to call a data processor to end the unlawful 
processing of data. If the data processor does not c
with his instruction, the Commissioner hast
m the public that unlawful data processing has taken 
place, by whom and to what extent. 
 
The Commissioner for Data Protection has the right to 
ask for and to examine information that is connected with 
public or personal data. The Commissioner may enter all 
premises where data processing takes place. State secrets 
and service secrets cannot obstruct the exercise of these 
right  by the Commissioner, but the Commissioner must keep s
the Commissioner must exercise his or her powers personally. 
In such cases, the Commissioner may only examine documents 
 19  
  
concerning data processing that are specified by separate 
provisions of the law. All ombudspersons publish public 










D.  JURISDICTIONAL OVERSIGHT 
 
The most important Constitutional Court decision 
concerning national security deals with information and
documents created by the former state security services and
its agents, lustration, and freedom of information.19 
According to the Decision, the national security servic
must provide the lustration body with documents containi
information on those MP's and other high state officials -
numbering about 600 people altogether -- who are subject to 
the lustration process in order to determine whether they 
were officers or agents of the former state security 
service's political department. The decision also states 
that documents created by the former state security servic
which are no longer necessary, must be turned over to the 




As in most democracies, the Media has a special role
monitoring the Hungarian Security Services. The major 
independent television news networks such as TV2 and RTL 
Club and journals such as Népszabadság, Magyar Nemzet, 
Magyar Hírlap all act as honest-brokers when reporting on 
activities of the security services. According to Janos 
Szabo: 
                     
19        Decision of the Government, No. 60/94, December 12, (Budapest, 
1994) 
 20  
  
 
Within the MOD and General Staff information and 
public relation bodies have been founded aiming at 
coordinating the flow of military information to 
e public, at increase of competence of civilian 
urnalists and at positive effecting of the 
 
The media enjoys the freedom to investigate and 
criticize any questionable endeavors of the Military and 
 
 
hip falls not only under the 
authority of the Hungarian government, but it also has to 
 policy, directives and oversight. As a 
member of NATO, and a European Union aspirant, Hungary is 
commi
om 
20   János Szabó: Some Conflicts of Civilian Control During Transition 
th
jo
public relations.20  
Intelligence Community.  Also, intelligence professionals
and other members of the Hungarian military are not 
permitted knowingly to lie or mislead the press or the
population in general.  
 
F.  INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Hungarys membership in NATO also has been a vehicle 
for the democratization and modernization of its 
intelligence organizations. To gain membership, Hungary 
enacted a series of intense reforms to reinforce civilian 
control and oversight measures and to ensure transparency. 
Hungarian intelligence leaders
comply with NATO
tted to democratic principals and freedom. With this 
membership, Hungary is also committed to securing freed





of Hungarian Defense Sector, Conference on Civil-military Relations 
nse 
 
in the Context of an Evolving NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Defe
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997), p. 203. 
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VI. HUNGARY’S ROLE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM 
rrorism is always a crime, yet in its purest 
form has usually involved criminal activity (murder, 
property damage, etc) for a political end, be it 
national independence, or the release of imprisoned 
terrorists. Often, terrorist acts sought to destabilize 
the government by undermining the electorates 
confidence in the authorities.21 Hungarys Ambassador 
to the United Nations in New York, André Erdős stated 
that:  
e barbaric acts of September 11 have proven with 
ementary force that, in fact, terrorism knows no 
boundaries () their act is an attack against all 
we stand for, we believe in, against the very 
foundations of our civilizations.22 
 
He continued by saying that Hungary would be part 
of a global coalition, where all nations act in unison, 
in the same cohesive spirit of purpose, to prevent and 
suppress the scourge of terrorism. 
   
Hungarys determination in the fight against terrorism 
was not born out of the events of September 11. Three years 
prior, in 1998, in consequence of the terror attacks 
witnessed by Hungary in the middle of 90s, the United 
States and Hungary joined forces in a comprehensive plan to 
intensify the attack on international organized crime and 
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21   The New Threat of Organized Crime and Terrorism Jane Defense 
Weekly, online, 
www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/000619_1_n.shtml 
(3 December 2002)   
22   Agenda Item 166 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
Statement by  H.E. Ambassador Andre Erdős, online, 
www.un.org/terrorism/statemetns/hungaryE.html (29 November 2002) 
  
terrorism in Central Europe. According to the U.S. Federal 








ix-point assistance plan was created that provided 
for a U.S.-Hungarian Law Enforcement Liaison and a formation 
of a Hungarian-American Law Enforcement Working Group. In 
recog
organized crime and terrorism, the groups objective is to 
develop better communications and information exchange, 
using the Italian American Working Group as a model.  Part 
of the plan also included enhanced training for Hungarian 
y 
 is 
to combat terrorism. 
ungary 
r 
revealing his name. Hungary enacted the Act on Aggravation 
       
 
primarily international organized criminal grou
that are either based in or active in Budapest
Because of its location, Budapest has histori
been a center of commerce and finance in Ce
Europe.  In the recent years, Budapest has se
the presence of organized-and often violent-
criminal organizations that engage in a wide range 
of illegal activities affecting not only 




nition of the dual threat of international and 
Law Enforcement and Forensics. The development of mutuall
shared databases and the development of electronic links
another key in the Hungarian effort 
 
The fact that Hungary is at a crossroads of commerce 
attracts the criminal and terrorism underworld. Money 
laundering activities have been widely practiced and H
has been singled out for things such as anonymous bank 
accounts.  In response to this, it is no longer possible to 
open a savings account in Hungary without the account-holde
              
23    FBI Press Room Release-1998, FBI and Hungary Join Forces in 
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of the Provisions for Fighting Against Terrorism and for the
Prevention of Money Laundering and on 
 
the Establishment of 
Restricting Measures on 27 November 2001. Only banks and 
their agents are permitted to change money; existing money-
excha
international co-operation: Hungary has concluded a set of 
bilateral treaties on terrorism with twenty-eight States, 





of 9/11 has called for the further development of 
international law in the struggle against global terrorism. 
nal 
                    
nge outlets were closed as of June 2001. 
 
Aware of the significance of regional and 
e European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
in the framework of the Council of Europe. Hungarian 
efforts also have been bolstered by an ever-increasing 
cooperation with the European Union. Hungarys member
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also entails 
cooperation and the provision of support in the collectiv
fight against terrorism.24 
 
Hungary also is party to all major international 
conventions pertaining to international terrorism. The 
Hungarian Parliament, in a resolution following the events
 
Today, one of the priorities of the Hungarian 
Intelligence Services is to contribute to the internatio
effort against terrorism. With this in mind, the current 
complicated structure of the intelligence system needs to be 
streamlined to be more effective and integrate with other 
 
24   Agenda Item 166 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
Statement by  H.E. Ambassador Andre Erdős, online, 
www.un.org/terr
 
orism/statemetns/hungaryE.html (29 November 2002) 
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nations in this global effort. The urgent nature of the 
terrorist threat is now the impetus for rationalizing and 
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 27  
ry inherited a military 
establishment that had been prepared and outfitted as part 
of the Warsaw Pacts doctrine of coalition warfare. It was 
saddled with an oversized command structure, antiquated 
armaments, organizational asymmetries and apathetic 
personnel. The number of combat, logistical and training 
units was excessive and there were virtually no indigenous 
air defense capabilities.25 But with the goal of NATO 
accession in mind, much has been accomplished in 
restructuring the HDF defense forces. Since the new 
strategic environment requires a smaller, more agile force, 
the large, Cold-War-era ground divisions needed to be 
reduced in both size and number.  
 
While the military establishment could tailor its 
reform along NATO guidelines, there still remain a few 
obstacles for intelligence system. The most significant 
obstacles to the transition was to establish a strong legal, 
budgetary and organizational foundation for civilian 
control, while simultaneously maintaining professionalism 
and combat readiness. In other words, it is a serious 
challenge to maintain a credible defense and intelligence 
system while the entire political, societal and economic 
system is in the midst of transition. According to Brigitte 
Sauerwein:  
 
                     
25   Sauerwein, Brigitte, Defense Adequacy: The Hungarian Defence 
Forces, Jane's Intelligence Review 6, no. 10 (October 1994). p. 
438. 
  
Insofar as the Hungarian military is concerned, 
su
fo
ccessful ludes the 
llowing: (1) placing the military under the 
thority and supervision of the elected 













elligence are tensions that exist between the 
civil bureaucracy and both military and civilian 




codification of the chains of command and are
responsibility over armed forces between 
institutions and within the military 
establishment; (3) termination and prohibition of 
the activities and political parties within armed 
forces as well as an effective ban on partisan 
political activities by military personnel: (
establishing the governments fiscal 
responsibility over defense expenditures an the 
executive branchs accountability to the 
legislature over military affairs; (5
democratizing the m litary establishment itsel
with special attention inculcating mil
personnel with fundamental democratic values (..
Despite some shortcomings, during the 1990
Hungary successfully democratized its armed forces 
and established democratic civil-military
relations.26  
 
ssessing the state of intelliA
ry has become a more difficult task over the past 
decade because issues are now more complex. The progress
intelligence reform in Hungary has been confirmed by the 
commitment shown by intelligence leaders and political 
elites to democratic political ideals. Many of the 
constitutional, legal and administrative requests for civil
control or supremacy over the intelligence have been 
implemented but Hungary is still fine-tuning specific 
mechanisms of intelligence management. 
 
Among the obstacles to the effective oversight of 
Hunga ian intr
                     
26    Ibid., p. 90. 
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professionalism and issue of expertise are key words. 
ding to Marybeth Ulrich: 
 
The relevant question in the transitioning states, 
then, is not whether the officer corps is 
professional, but whether it possesses a brand of 
professionalism appropriate to the type of state that 
it serves.27  
 
Democratic or political supremacy over intelligence 
izations is defined as the subordination of the secret 




services to the democratically elected civilian leaders of 
the g
experienced professional military corps that is funded by a 
civilian authority and a strong non-governmental component 









 mislead politicians 
or intervene directly in political affairs. Without clear 
sis.28  
Tensions between the government, civil bureaucracy
intelligence establishment are a natural occurrence. The
effect of intelligence depends on its institutional 
reputation and the personal chemistry between practitioner
and users.29 In the Western system, the security service
enjoy a delicate relationship with government offici
where the intelligence is responsible for providing 
professional (technical) expertise to civilian politic
The lack of intelligence professionalism may lead some 
sectors of the intelligence community to
                     
27    Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Mili
(Michigan, The University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 110. 
28    Rudolf Joó, The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, The 
taries, 
Experience of Hungary, Challiot Paper, (Paris, Institute for 
Security Studies of Western European Union),p. 6. 
29    Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge, 
rsity Press, 1996), p. 142. Cambridge Unive
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political guidance the intelligence community may see 
themselves as the servants of a political party or ideology, 
rather than of the state. For this reason, they may feel no 
obligation to conform to the oversight of the democratically 
elect
objec




ence must operate.   






affairs helps to combat public apathy and to facilitate 
public support for strategic and multilateral security and 
i
ed government, thus developing their own set of 
tives. Because of this, intelligence services may 
ed and operating independently of the state, it 
functions like a state within a state. It has its own 
independent command structure, organization, recruitment and
equipment, and thus, may resist subordination to the
government. By contrast, Lowenthal writes that:  
 
openness that is an inherent part of a representative 
democratic government clashes with the secrecy within 
which the intellig 30
 
lishment and continual education to reinforce the 
democratic principles of a civilian controlled intelligenc
can prevent both of these dangers. Only a strong civi
corps can harmonize the capabilities of the secret services 
with national goals, objectives and financial resources.  
 
Development of civilian expertise also can produ
long-term benefits of facilitating greater public 
understanding of new security challenges and the necessi
of transformation. Efforts to build up a security 
constituency recognize that public interest in security 
ntelligence commitments. 
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Hungary has a great deficit in civilian security 
expertise. Therefore, one of the priorities of the country 
is to create civilian security communities, which can 
provide skilled personnel to secret services, parliame
committees, research institutes and other NGOs. This sho
be a significant objective of the restructuring or 
implementation the intelligence system. 
 
However civilianization is not a guarantee for a 
reformation of the intelligence system. Civil experts 





officers. Therefore another question is, how to match legal, 
institutional, organizational and personnel changes with the 
new and still transforming political framework? Although a 
balance should be kept between the peaceful transition of  
tion 
e 




security environment and with it, the change of the 
priorities and focus of intelligence. According to Baranyi: 
 
 
military and intelligence institutions, and the introduc
of necessary oversight and control, the last issue is the 
priority. Regarding the new democracies such as Hungary, on
has to take into account the nation-specific circumstances 
in which the transition is developing and the nations 
rned, the actual political character, the economic 
conditions, the societal framework, the media, and 
international environment contribute to the unique character
of each nations experience. 
 
Another key issue is the change in the global the 
 31  
30    Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From secrets to Policy, 
(Washington D.C., A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1999), p. 16. 
  
Since 1990, defense officials and politicians have 
been quick to point
specific enemy and i
 out that Hungary has no 
s under no direct threat. 







country of the Warsaw Pacts southern theater. It was 
responsible for the south German Plain and the Po Plain in 
re 
garian security and defense 
                  
St
they must take seriously, particularly because of
Hungarys unfavorable geostrategic position. It
has no natural borders intimidating to land 
forces; it is relatively easy to overrun, as a
number of armies have demonstrated throughout the
past millennium; and its military establishment 
has weakened considerably since 1989.31 
 
Before 1989, Hungarys strategic responsibility
being the first line of defense as the mo
Italy. The main target countries therefore, were Western 
Germany and Italy as well as the United Kingdom and the 
United States. With the new internal and international 
environment the whole previous defense and intelligence 
strategy collapsed overnight. The previous doctrines became 
irrelevant: the target countries, the enemies, the 
controlling authorities, the driving ideas and methods, the 
financial resources, external and internal relations, and 
the goals of these organizations changed as well. The new 
security services emerged as a consequence of the new 
circumstances. Though new services were created, they we
still based on the previous system. Most people did not 
realize that the Hungarian military and intelligence 
services, under the Warsaw Pact, had virtually the same 
doctrine and objectives as the USSR, which were to defend 
the Soviet Union first and Hun
   
31         
 32  
Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, 
Andrew A. Michta, Americas New Allies, Poland, Hungary an
Czech Republic in NATO, (Washington D.C., University of Washington 





needs second. Hungary could not easily turn to NATO for a 
solut
communist-type intelligence services, and the antagonistic 
relationship between intelligence services of NATO and the 
Warsa









to develop a more technically skilled and more flexible 




ion, because of the fundamental nature of the 
w Pact. The Hungarian services were interested in 
rust their Eastern counterparts.  
 
Another intelligence challenge of the post September 
11th period is that the secret services in transitional
democracies are seeking to increase their professionali
keeping up with their Western counterparts. In other words, 
secret services of transitional states try to demonstrate 
that they possess a high level of professional expertise,
and are well trained in both operational and managerial 
arts. To some extent, this professionalization may entail
the development of corporate identity and activism. This 
trend towards increasing intelligence professionalis
serve to increase the potential political influence of the 
secret services in the national security policy-making 
process. 
 
In the post September 11th era, all security 
institutions anticipate the need for various types of 
alliances, and multinational intelligence reaction 
capabilities to fulfill missions, needs for low-intensity
(other than war) conflicts, often overseas or out of area. 
Therefore, the transitional democracies have found the need
pr
riety of challenges and at different levels of 
nsity. According to Lowenthal: 
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The cold war quickly shifted from a struggle for 
predominance in postwar Europe to a glo
struggle in which virtually any nation or reg
could be a pawn between the two sides. Although 
some areas remained more important than others, 
none could be written off entirely.32 
 
The trend of declining mass information gathering 
reveals a transformation in the relation
bal 
ion 
ship between secret 




e transition process is more complicated for 




tutional evolution of intelligence to influence 
societal attitudes. In the Cold War, the intelligences r
was traditionally mass espionage. Residual roles in 
emergency response, aid to civilian power, counter 
terrorism, and sovereignty protection are now being 
emphasized. Concomitantly, the global role of intelligence 
in the more complex international environment and 
multinational (UN, NATO, OSCE and other) operations has 
expanded. Such potential deployments are by virtue of thei
low national significance, more politically sensitive for 
the domestic public, a phenomenon reinforcing the move 
towards professional intelligence. 
  
Th
Hungary was left without a model to copy and therefore 
to create a hybrid system combining what they alread
the old Soviet style, and what they were learning about the
new Western system. Due to the sensitive nature of 
classified information and compartmentalized data that is 
common to intelligence, information sharing is very 
cumbersome. This delicate and complex situation allowed for 
                     
32    Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From
(Washington D.C., A Division of Congre
 secrets to Policy, 
ssional Quarterly Inc., 
1999), pp. 11-12. 
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some leaders to resist making a complete transition to a 
democratically controlled service. To add to the burden, the 
post 
establishment were naïve about defense matters and easily 
duped. The bulwarks of the old style senior officers were 






ill in these gaps. 
Barany writes that: 
ing 
 
33    Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery
communist politicians chosen to lead the defense 
civilian experts on military matters who can advise 
politicians was another factor in preventing a truly 
complete transition to a full democratization of the 
Intelligence service and civil-military relations.  
 
Hungarian intelligence oversight operates in a 
democratic environment, where the executive and legis
powers are separated, well established, and the tools of the
civil societal control (such as the media) are stro
to the special operating environment of intelligence, 
however, some leaders who cannot shake their former mindset 
create obstacles to civilian control when it comes to actua
democratic or actives. Perhaps this just takes some time
the next generation to come in and f
 
In sum, while the institutional structure of 
parliamentary civilian control over the armed 
forces in Hungary is adequate, the internal 
control mechanism of the MOD are in need of 
further development. In large measure the problems 
have been due to general inexperience and the 








Andrew A. Michta, Americas New Allies, Poland, Hungary an
Czech Republic in NATO, (Washington D.C., University of Washing
Press, 1999), p. 92. 
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No doubt that the success or failure in stabilizing a
reinforcing effective democratic oversight and downsizing of 
the Hungarian intelligence, has a direct influence on t
outcome of Hungarys further European integration and 
prosperity. Failure of developing a new, smaller, more cost
effective and more rapid reactive intelligence system, wou
at least indirectly risk the internal political stabi
and democratic structure. Consequently, an eurofomize
national intelligence must be the interest of all the 












Experience has shown that without a robust system
of independent oversight, the system is wide open 
to abuse. Security services are unable to resist 
the temptation to indulge in activities that have 
no place in a democracy. The cure can be as 
dangerous as the disease.34 
 
The creation of new intelligence system offers the
opportunity to the Hungarian National Intelligenc




to become more effective and rationalized through pragmatic 
synergies. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, ecological 
threats, policing the cyber space are not exclusively 
concerns of a single security service, but serious concern 
to all of them. Accepting this argument, Richard Norton-
Taylor believes that:  
 
it is important to consider first the nature of the 
threats to the state and society rather than starting 
with some preexisting institutional framework.35  
 
The creation of a new intelligence system should begin 
by identifying threat. It should then estimate the most cost 
effective path to democratic transition. There are two major 
problems that must be mastered in the Hungarian Intelligence 
Community. The first is oversight and control of the five 
national intelligence services, since two of them are 
subordinate to the military and three of them are under 
civil management. 
                     
34    Richard Norton-Taylor, In Defense of the Realm, (London, Civil 





The second dilemma igence in 
government foreign
nal 
democracy should be enhanced by implementing the following 
princ









he main elements of the new security 
dispensation to the civil society. 
• Deepen Parliamentary and Governmental oversight to 
committees. 
 is the role of the intell
 and domestic policy.  
 
The intelligence system of the Hungarian constitutio
iples: 
 Primary authority of the 
 Separation of the intelligence from policy-making
• Political neutrality of the intelligence services. 
• Accountability and parliamentary oversight over the 
services. 
• Subordination of the services to the rule of la
practice. 
• Maintaining a fair balance between the secrecy an
transparency. 
Since the current intelligence system still has not 
through major changes, and the new intelligence 
ces are likely to be essentially the same as old ones, 
it is necessary and high time to develop a program to 
systemically and courageously replace all the unwanted 
aspects of the old system with a new apparatus. The driving 
ideas of that new system should be the following: 
• Redefine Hungarys security vision and framewor
a new law. 
• Point out t
support implementation of the defined changes 
through special ad hoc 
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• Providing a clearer and stronger guidance regar
the intelligence priorities by the
ding 
 legislative and 
executive committees. 
•
er fluent transition and interdependence.    
• 




king against the goals or outside the 
 






To reinforce Hungarys judicial, executive and 
legislat
future i
   
 Strengthen cooperation among the planning, budgetary 
and intelligence services in order to maintain the 
furth
Comprehensively review internal procedures to be in 
line with 
directives. 
Develop and strengthen managerial ability that will 
enable the services to overcome difficulties of 
further tra
Erase or phase out individuals at managerial levels 
who are wor
perimeters of the new dispensation. 
ng these challenges, the new system should follow 
functional oriented principles, which emphasizes clear
strong civilian control via intelligence oversight and cost 
effectiveness.36 This new structure also provides a bet
path for the flow of information from the collectors thr
the analysts to the consumers. It eliminates superfluous 
sub-organizations in the reporting chain.  
ive oversight as well as to expedite Hungarys 
ntegration into the European Union, some more 
 39  
                  
 M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From secrets to Policy36    Mark , 
(Washington D.C., A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1999), pp. 34-38. 
 
  
aspects of the Western especially the British system should 








But the United Kingdom has managed to create a system 
of ministerial responsibility for security intelligence that 
can achi
and adeq  
Hungarian case is concerned, ministerial supervision and 
control 
specifications. Since the current political parties have not 
recruited and developed appropriate experts on that field, 
Hungarian Supervision is rather just theoretical than 
pract
s is that 
cruitment to its administrative apparatuses 
al 
e are two extreme possibilities with respect to 
sterial control, both which pose considerable 
ers: either a complete lack of control or 
sterial direction in the partisan interests of 
governing party.37  
eve both goals of effective ministerial direction 
uate oversight of those agencies.38 As far as the
should be based primarily on national political 
ical. Gill also emphasizes, that: 
 
the question of recruitment to security 
intelligence agencies is particularly important 
because, if it merely reflects the political 
dominance of certain classes of groups, partisan 
direction by ministers will not be a problem since 
it will usually be unnecessary.39  
 
However, according to C. Dandeker: 
 
A central feature of modern state
re
becomes based on patronage and more on imperson
and competitive educational criteria.40 
 
                     
37   Peter Gill, Policing Politics, Security Intelligence and the 
Liberal Democratic State, (London, Frank Cass, 1994), p. 217. 
38   Ibid, p. 259. 
40   
39   Ibid, p. 230. 
 C. Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge Polity Press, 1990), p. 53. 
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Building a new generation of professional expertise is 
a key responsibility both for the political parties and the 
actual intelligence community.  
e 
position of Director General and the Ministerial Committee 





of the agencies, so too, should Hungary centralize its 
monit
expen
sophisticated technology, a more flexible, rapid reaction 
capabilities and panel system, should be introduced in the 
field
allow
constantly changing national security concerns. Shifting the 
attention to the combat elements the new system also 
should contribute eliminate redundant supply units and 
ese 
 
Just as the British ensure Executive Oversight via th
tor General who reports to appropriate ministers. As 
previously stated, Hungary has a Committee on National 
Security Affairs similar to the UKs Ministerial Committee.
But Hungary can improve its parliamentary oversight by 
adding another working group, similar to the Permanent 
Secretaries Committee on Intelligence to assist in review
and reporting to the Prime Minister. Also, one must remember 
that who ever controls the purse strings wields control 
over the entity. So, as the United Kingdom has an 
Intelligence and Security Committee to e
oring of both civilian and military intelligence 
diture. 
 
Based on the new security challenges and more 
s of HUMINT, SIGINT and analysis. This scheme would 
 for a shift in operational concentration with the 
better utilize the human resources and properties of th
organizations.  
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The proposed structure focuses on three pillars: clear 
and strong civilian control, efficient professional 
activity, and cost effectiveness. The unified scenario also 







ss from the collectors through the analysts to the 
consumers, eliminating and cutting out the superfluous sub-
organizations in the chain of report. Based on the new 
security challenges and increased technology, more flexible
rapid reaction capabilities and a panel system, a syst
that allows for the intelligence services to operate based 
on function in a separate but connected structure. It 
be introduced in the fields of HUMINT, SIGINT and Analys
The emphasis will shift to a more operational, combat 
element approach. The new system would also eliminate 
redundancy in supply units, streamline and better utilize 
the human resources and equipment of these organiza
 42  
  
 
IX. VISION OF THE NEW INTEL ARCHITECTURE
 
An important consideration in any discussion of
structural, legal or institutional changes is the 
significance of political will and the danger of 
faith in the structural fix.41 
 
It is possible to define an unambiguous, logical model 
for intelligence provision, and that such a model would 
sharpen the decision makers focus on customers needs and 
values. The customers are the Hungarians and Hungarian 
Intelligence Community should reflect their values. New
principles, structures and strategies built on these co
values provides the basis of a better Community. The key 
strategy of fulfilling that deepened and simplified model, 





as well as civilian control, supervision over the services, 
and rationalized cost effectiveness, is the unification the 
civilian and military intelligence organizations and 
creating one new National Intelligence System (Figure 2-3). 
 
This structure is comprised of civilian control, but 
supported by military elements. It would reduce redundancy 
and unnecessary expenditure by consolidating the five 
components of the present system under one overseeing 
authority, The National Secret Services of the Republic of 
Hungary. The new structure will be divided into two main 
bodies, The Intelligence Bureau, which is responsible for 
                     
41   R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Intelligence, Policy and National Security, 
R. K. Betts, American Strategic Intelligence: Policies, Priorities 
and Direction, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1981), p. 248., J. M. 
Oseth, Regulating US Intelligence Operations, (University Press of 
Kentucky, 1985), pp. 185-7. 
 
  
External concerns and conducting foreign intelligence and 
the National Security Bureau, that will be responsible for 
internal security issues. 
intelligence capabilities are meeting real world challenges. 
By satisfying these requirements, the new model also will 










The new structure should ensure that the national 
ctors through the analysts to the consumers. 
 
 The services should be charged with contributing to 
the national security by using both open and confidentia
information sources. Based on the new security challenges
and more sophisticated technology, a more flexible, rapid 
reaction capabilities and panel system, should be 
introduced in the field of HUMINT, which should keep and 
develop the special operations capabilities. This would 
allow for a shift in operational concentration with the 
constantly changing national security concerns.   
 
In
to report to the responsible Ministers (Justice, 
Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defense) and/or directly to 
the Head of Government (Figure 3) modeled after the UK
Intelligence Structure in a parliamentary system.42 Bot
Government via responsible Ministries and the Parliaments 
National Security Committees will determine national 
security interests and priorities. 
                     
42   Peter Gill, Policing Politics, Security Intelligence and the 
Liberal Democratic State, (London, Frank Cass, 1994), p. 258. 
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The legislative oversight should be instituted via the
chain of governmental command, through the designated 
Ministers on the one hand a
 
nd on the other hand through 
specific parliamentary institutions, such as the National 
Security Committee, Foreign Committee and Defense Committee 
 
ile the Hungarian Intelligence system has made many 
advan
e 
of the Parliament, Ombudspersons - The Commissioner for Data 
Protection and most importantly by the Constitutional Court
Decisions. (Figure 5) 
 
Wh
ces in operating effectively under a democratic 
government in the last decade, it still needs to re-evaluat
its structure. It needs to become a more efficient 
organization that can still operate effectively, while 
maintaining its civilian authority and oversight. 
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Change is never easy, but it is inevitable. Hungary has 
ne a great deal to fill the void created by the post-
rsaw Pact security vacuum. It has adopted to Western 
eology and principles while transitioning its government 
d economy to a democracy and free trade. But there is 
ill much work to do.  
 
It must also address the problem of redirecting a whole 
telligence mechanism from a repressive agenda to one 
holding new democratic ideals and methods. Hungary could 
nage the transition of its intelligence without any 
gnificant problems. But in the case of such a special and 
complex system like intelligence, the transition always 
takes a long time. 
 
If the old management, methods and structure will be 
totally replaced by the new generation of professional 
intelligence officers and civil experts, Hungary can state: 
The first phase of the creation of an intelligence apparatus 
that is founded on democratic principles is complete. 
According to William S. Brei: 
 
The challenges facing the Intelligence Community are 
formidable. Continual budget and manpower cuts 
degrade managerial continuity, experience levels, and 
the technical expertise. Yet the international arena 
and issues that we monitor are becoming more complex. 
Learning to work smarter has become imperative.43  
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43    William S. Brei,  Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical 
Procedure, Occasional Paper Number Two, (Joit Military Intelligence 
Collage, January 1996), p. 1. 
  
To understand Breis idea and create a task oriented, a 
well-organized, cost effective and smaller intelligence 
structure is still a remaining responsibility for Hungary. 
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